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3.1  Introduction 
By any standard, Bolivia’s economic crisis in the 1980s has been 
extraordinary. As seen in table 3.  I, Bolivia’s economic debacle of re- 
cent years is striking even in comparison with the poor performance 
of Bolivia’s neighbors. Like its neighbors, Bolivia suffered from major 
external shocks, including the rise in world interest rates in the early 
1980s, the cutoff in lending from the international capital markets, and 
the decline in world prices of Bolivia’s commodity exports. But the 
extent of  economic collapse in the face of these shocks suggests that 
internal factors as well  as the external shocks have  been  critical to 
Bolivia’s economic performance. The Bolivian hyperinflation of 1984- 
85, for example, which was one of the most dramatic inflations in world 
history, is the only 20th century hyperinflation that did not result from 
the dislocations of  war or revolution. One major theme of our work is 
that the recent economic crisis in Bolivia is a reflection of  political and 
economic conflicts in Bolivian society that have undermined  the de- 
velopment process throughout this century. 
Table 3.2  gives a brief political chronology of Bolivia since the Rev- 
olution  of  1952. The most striking aspect of  the chronology  is  the 
instability of constitutional rule in the country. The Revolution of 1952 
was led by the National Revolutionary  Movement, the MNR, which 
governed Bolivia for 12 years, winning elections in 1956 and 1960. The 
military  toppled the civilian regime in  1964, and ruled  without inter- 
ruption until  1978. A period of political chaos followed during 1978- 
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Table 3.1  Economic Performance in the 1980s, Selected Countries 
GDP Growth  Inflation  Terms of 
(annual rate)  (annual rate)  Debt-GNP*  Trade, 1985 
1980-85  1980-85  Ratio 1985  (1980 =  100) 
Bolivia  -4.5  569.1  136.8  86 
Latin America 
Argentina  -  1.4  342.8  56.4  88 
Brazil  1.3  147.7  43.8  87 
Mexico  0.8  62.2  52.8  98 
East Asia 
Malaysia  5.5  3. I  62.0  85 
Indonesia  3.5  10.7  36.6  97 
Korea  7.9  6.0  43.0  105 
Source: World  Bank, World Development Report 1987. 
“Medium-and long-term debt, public and private. 
82, with a rapid alternation of  military and civilian rule.  Civilian rule 
was restored in  1982, with the accession to power of Siles Zuazo. 
As in other Latin American  nations,  the alternation of power also 
reflected an alternation between populist and antipopulist politics. In 
Bolivia,  however,  this alternation has been  particularly  sharp. Gen- 
erally, the military rule was antipopulist, and especially antilabor. There 
was, however,  a brief  populist phase of  military  rule under General 
Torres in 1970-71,  which coincided with the leftist military government 
in Peru under Velasco. The civilian governments have all drawn their 
leaders from the MNR, though the civilian governments have varied 
widely in their policies, with populist phases during 1952-56 and 1982- 
85, and conservative phases during 1956-64  and 1985 to the present. 
The chronic political  instability,  and  more  specifically the swings 
between populist and antipopulist politics, reflect the deeper divisions 
in the Bolivian economy and society. Not only is Bolivia’s distribution 
of income and wealth highly unequal, but the various sectors in Bolivian 
society are highly mobilized to do battle over their shares of  income 
and wealth. Since the Revolution, all of the social factions have looked 
to the central government to satisfy their particular distributional agenda, 
and the battle for political power has also been a battle for a share of 
the national pie. The battle over shares has been particularly damaging 
since it has occurred in the context of a secular decline in the earnings 
of Bolivia’s key mining sector. That decline not only made the need 
for a  coherent  development  strategy  particularly  urgent,  but  also 
heightened the sense of desperation in the distributional battle. 
The result, not  surprisingly,  has been  a government stretched far 
beyond its fiscal capacity; an economic environment inimical to long- 
term investment; and an inability of  the key political actors to settle 59  Bolivia’s Economic Crisis 



















Bolivian Revolution, carried out by National Revolutionary Movement 
(MNR), under leadership of Dr. Victor Paz Estenssoro. 
Presidency of Paz Estenssoro; sharp rise in inflation, to 178.8% in  1956. 
Presidency of Hernan Siles Zuazo (MNR);  economic stabilization under 
U.S. and IMF supervision and finance. 
Second presidency of Paz Estenssoro. 
Third presidency of  Paz Estenssoro; Paz Estenssoro deposed in military 
coup led by General RenC Barrientos Ortuno. 
Co-presidency of Alfredo Ovando Candia and Barrientos Ortuno. 
Civilian presidency of Barrientos (dies in plane crash, April1969). 
Vice-president Luis Siles Salinas becomes president; deposed in coup by 
Ovando Candia. 
Ovando Candia deposed by  General Miranda. Miranda deposed by 
General Juan Jose Torres. 
Torres rules left-wing radical government. Deposed in coup,  jointly 
sponsored by the military, FBS. and MNR. 
General Hugo Banzer Suarez rules with MNR support. 
Banzer presidency under military rule; MNR withdrawal from government 
in  1974. 
Pereda becomes president in election marked by accusation of fraud. 
Pereda deposed by General David Padilla.  who calls for 1979 election. 
Election results in stalemate (no majority); Senate President Walter 
Guevara Arze serves as interim president. Guevara deposed by Colonel 
Natusch Busch; Busch resigns in  I5 days. President of Chamber of 
Deputies, Lidia Gueiler, becomes interim president. 
Electoral stalemate. Gueiler deposed in coup by Major General Luis 
Garcia Meza. 
Garcia Meza forced to resign in favor of General Bernal. General Bernal 
resigns in favor of General Torrelio. 
General Torrelio deposed in coup by General Vildoso Calderon. Congress 
reconvenes; names Siles Zuazo as president. 
Siles Zuazo announces early elections. Paz Estenssoro becomes president. 
New economic policy declared on 29 August 1985. 
on a sustained strategy for national economic development. The failure 
of  economic development has taken its  toll.  Bolivia  is  the poorest 
country in South America, with a per capita income of about $500, and 
the second poorest in the Western Hemisphere, behind Haiti. Between 
1952 and 1985, GNP grew at the meagre annual rate of 2.4 percent. 
In the next section of this chapter, we extend this analysis as to why 
Bolivia has failed to develop a workable strategy of long-term develop- 
ment. We then turn to an analytical chronology of  the recent economic 60  Juan Antonio MoraledJeffrey D. Sachs 
crisis, and highlight how the crisis has emerged  from the longer-term fail- 
ures that we have stressed. To understand the proximate economic de- 
terminants  of the crisis, we highlight the critical linkages between foreign 
borrowing, the exchange rate, and inflation, that are key to understand- 
ing both the onset of the hyperinflation and debt crisis, and the progress 
that has been made since 1985 in overcoming  the crisis. While major re- 
forms have been begun by the present government, many of the deepest 
problems in Bolivian society that contributed to the crisis remain unre- 
solved. We underline these areas of remaining difficulty, and discuss var- 
ious policy options for addressing them. 
3.2  The Long-Term Problems of  Bolivian Economic Growth 
Bolivia’s problems begin with the inherent difficulties of growth in 
a landlocked mining economy centered in breathtaking, yet forbidding, 
terrain more than  14,000 feet above sea level. Bolivia is a very large 
and sparsely populated country. Its area is greater than the combined 
areas of  the United Kingdom, West Germany, and France, with a pop- 
ulation of only 6 million. The country is divided geographically between 
the Andean highlands, where the mining industry is located, and the 
lowlands to the east, where petroleum products and commercial ag- 
riculture  are situated. From the beginning  of colonial  development, 
Bolivia’s political and economic center of gravity has been in the high- 
lands. The secular decline of the mining sector has led in recent decades 
to a shift in economic and political activity to the east.This shift, which 
is the cause of significant political conflict, has been accelerated by the 
recent sharp crash of tin prices in October 1985. 
Bolivia’s economy since the colonial period has been based on min- 
ing, first silver, from the colonial period until the late 19th century, and 
then tin in the 20th century. With population centered in the highlands 
and neighboring valleys, transport costs are extremely high. Therefore, 
while it has been profitable for Bolivia to export minerals such as silver 
and tin that have a high value added per unit weight, and therefore a 
low share of transport costs per unit value, Bolivia has been unable to 
overcome the transport costs for almost  any kind  of  manufactured 
product. The problem of transport costs was greatly exacerbated by 
Bolivia’s loss of its littoral on the Pacific Coast, in  the traumatic War 
of the Sea against Chile and Peru in  1879. 
The requirement  of  high  value  added per unit  weight  in  Bolivian 
exports helps to explain Bolivia’s only real diversification  of exports 
in recent years: coca leaf derivatives (the precursors of cocaine) and 
petroleum products. Petroleum products, particularly  natural gas ex- 
ported to Argentina, can be carried out of the country by  pipeline, 
while coca leaf can be profitably transported even if carried on a peas- 61  Bolivia’s Economic Crisis 
ant’s back. Table 3.3 shows Bolivia’s concentration of noncoca exports 
in  recent  years.  Among Bolivia’s measured exports (i.e.,  excluding 
coca), tin and petroleum products usually accounted for much more 
than half  of total  exports during the  1960s, 1970s, and  1980s. Coca 
exports in the  1980s are generally estimated to equal the sum of  tin 
and natural gas exports. 
Many of Bolivia’s problems can be seen as the tragic playing out of the 
secular decline in the mining sector, a process that has been underway 
Table 3.3  Relative Shares of Tin and Natural Gas in Total Exports of Bolivia 
As 96 of  Merchandise 





































































Sourw: Central Bank of  Bolivia, Boletin Estadistico, various issues 
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derway for at least half a century. (See Malloy 1970 for an authoritative 
account of 20th century Bolivian history before the Revolution, with 
an emphasis on the secular decline of the tin sector starting in the late 
1920s.) Actually, Bolivia’s first deep crisis came with the depletion of 
silver deposits and the fall of world silver prices at the end of the last 
century. Good fortune, however,  pulled Bolivia out of  crisis when a 
boom in world demand for tin followed the development of the modern 
canning process. The apogee of modern Bolivian economic develop- 
ment relative to the neighboring countries was reached in the first two 
decades of the 20th century, when tin was intensively developed, and 
when export earnings provided the basis for a major extension of the 
country’s infrastructure, including roads and the railway system. 
Tin lodes were increasingly exhausted in the 1920s, and Bolivia began 
to lose export competitiveness with other producers. When tin prices 
collapsed at the start of the Great Depression, Bolivia became the first 
country in that crisis to default on its sovereign foreign debt, in January 
193  1. Bolivia was also the last country in Latin America to settle these 
defaulted debts after World War 11. 
The collapse of tin undermined both the economy and the political 
system, known as the Rosca, which was managed heavily in favor of 
the three tin magnates, Patino, Hochschild, and Aramayo. The public 
finances, which  relied  heavily  on tin  exports and international trade 
generally, were gravely weakened, and the financial problems generally 
undermined  the central government. Thus, the period  between  1931 
and the Revolution  of  1952 was an era of  political  uncertainty and 
unrest. Bolivia lost the bloody and costly Chaco War to Paraguay  in 
the mid- 1930s, an experience that heightened the political mobilization 
of workers and the middle classes unhappy with the leadership of the 
oligarchy. A military government with a mixed fascist and revolutionary 
orientation  came to power  in  1943, but  was  deposed in  1946. The 
oligarchy regained control in  1946, but was swept aside by the Revo- 
lution of 1952. 
The leaders of the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 drew inspiration from 
the Mexican Revolution, and from Mexico’s Institutional Revolution- 
ary Party (the PRI), in the formation and policies of the Bolivian MNR. 
The experience under the Rosca had  thoroughly  discredited  private 
wealthholders as a class capable of leading national development. The 
revolutionary  leaders looked to the public sector as means of growth 
that would be broadly based and equitable. They put in place an eco- 
nomic system, which can broadly be called state capitalism, that as- 
signed  the  bulk  of  capital  formation  to the  public  sector,  both  for 
infrastructure and for industrial production  in  state enterprises. The 
leading state enterprises were COMIBOL, the national tin company, 
and YPFB, the state petroleum company. 63  Bolivia’s Economic Crisis 
It should be stressed that the reliance on the state sector was guided 
by political considerations as well as by an ideology of economic de- 
velopment. The revolutionary movement, after toppling the oligarchy, 
was hardly interested  in returning power to a small class of wealth- 
holders.  Indeed, given Bolivia’s  highly  unequal  income distribution, 
the problems of establishing a political equilibrium together with mass 
participation (indeed mass political mobilization) were evident. A large 
state sector was viewed as providing a political answer to the distri- 
butional bind. As seen in table 3.4, Bolivia’s income distribution re- 
mains,  despite the Revolution,  highly  unequal. The Revolution  did 
succeed, particularly through land reform, in raising the income share 
of the poorest 20  percent of  households  above the shares found in 
several other Latin American countries. 
Despite the great variation of governments after 1952, one aspect of 
the model of state capitalism remained fairly constant. Whether the 
government was of the populist left, as under the military leader Gen- 
eral Torres in  1970-71,  or of the right, as under the military regime of 
General Hugo Banzer during 1971-78,  the state was looked to as the 
guiding force of development. As shown in table 3.5, a large fraction 
of total national investment, generally more than half in the 1960s and 
1970s, was invested  directly by the public  sector. This predominant 
role of the state is, of  course, not unusual for late developers, as was 
elegantly demonstrated by Gerschenkron many years ago in the case 
of the European latecomers. And as stressed in Sachs (1987) the state 
has played  a very large, and apparently successful, role in  spurring 
economic development in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. What has been 
distinctive in the Bolivian  case, however,  has been the fundamental 
Table 3.4  Income Distribution  in Selected Countries 
Ratio, 











































Source: World Bank; national sources for Taiwan. 64  Juan Antonio MoraledJeffrey D. Sachs 
Table 3.5  Public and Private Participation in the Gross Capital Fixed 
Formation 
Public  Private  Total 


























203.0  42 
213.0  40 
281.2  44 
239. I  45 
452.0  54 
576.0  62 
570.1  60 
451.1  43 
478.3  50 
581.6  50 
929.0  52 
910.5  59 
1,002.0  56 
1,170.0  40 
1,548.0  59 
1,690.0  37 
2,199.0  34 
3,711.0  41 
5,949.0  56 
7,930.0  64 
10,216.0  66 
8,928.0  58 
9.767.0  50 
206.0  58 
313.0  60 
355.8  56 
292.2  55 
382.7  46 
348.3  38 
387.6  40 
599.7  57 
470.8  50 
574.1  50 
841 .0  40 
633.4  41 
790.0  44 
781 .0  40 
1,075.0  41 
2,829.0  83 
4,351  .O  66 
5,344.0  59 
4,736.0  44 
4,484.0  36 
5,180.0  34 
6,378.0  42 
7.361 .0  42 
Amount  % 
489.0  100 
526.0  i00 
637.0  100 
581.3  100 
834.7  100 
924.3  100 
957.7  100 
1,050.8  100 
949.4  100 
1,155.7  100 
1,770.0  100 
1,543.9  100 
1,792.0  100 
1,95  I .0  100 
2,823.0  100 
4,519.0  100 
6,550.0  100 
9,055.0  100 
10,655.0  100 
I2,4 14.0  100 
15,396.0  100 
15,306.0  100 
17,328.0  100 
100 
100 
Source: Ministry of Planning and Central Bank of  Bolivia 
disjunction between the weak capacity of  the state on the one hand, 
and the responsibilities invested in the state on the other. 
The whole concept of more equitable growth through a large state 
sector collapsed in a mass of inconsistencies over the 30 years between 
the Revolution and the onset of the Bolivian hyperinflation. During the 
post-Revolution period, leftist leaders were always too weak politically 
to satisfy their redistributional aims. To the extent, for instance, that 
they aimed to raise public-sector salaries or to increase public-sector 
investment and employment, they lacked the capacity to tax income 
and wealth necessary to finance the larger state sector. If necessary, 
the Bolivian army was prepared  to intervene to forestall populist or 
redistributionist actions, as it did in 1971. For these reasons, leftist or 
populist  leaders  have been constantly forced  to rely on inflationary 
finance or foreign aid and foreign borrowing to carry out their distri- 
butional and developmental goals. The first high  inflation in  Bolivia 65  Bolivia’s Economic Crisis 
came in the wake of the Revolution, and the second came with the left- 
wing government of Siles Zuazo in  1982. 
Leaders on the right,  such as Barrientos  and Banzer, were not in- 
terested to limit the power of the state, but rather to use the state to 
satisfy a different agenda.  While governments on the left  sought re- 
distribution through  higher wages and a larger role for public-sector 
workers, governments on the right  sought instead  to bolster favored 
segments of the private sector through generous government subsidies. 
Governments of the left have generally paid for higher public salaries 
through printing money (i.e., the inflation tax) or through foreign bor- 
rowing, since they have been forestalled from raising taxes. Govern- 
ments on the right, on the other hand, have rejected higher taxes outright, 
and have instead sought to finance the government through a reduction 
of public-sector wages (often with overt repression of labor), and also 
through foreign borrowing. Note one common theme of both types of 
governments: let the foreigners pay! 
The conflict over income distribution continues to have a number of 
profound effects on economic policy and economic performance. The 
first effect that we have noted is fiscal indiscipline, since powerful high- 
income groups veto the income and wealth taxes that would be needed 
to  finance a large public sector. A second effect is the deep politicization 
of almost all instruments of economic policy. There are few economic 
policy tools in Bolivia that are judged mainly on the basis of efficiency 
rather than distribution. Exchange rate changes, for example, typically 
have been avoided in Bolivia until currency overvaluations reach ab- 
surd proportions, for fear of a resulting distributional battle. Similarly, 
public-sector prices have often been stuck at levels far below market 
clearing rates, for the same reason, despite the often devastating fiscal 
consequences. A third effect of the continuing battle over income dis- 
tribution  is  the uncertainty for private investment spending  that is 
created by  the alternation between  leftists and rightist  regimes  with 
widely varying agendas. A fourth effect has been the degeneration of 
politics into a fierce battles of the “ins”  versus the “outs.”  With the 
state viewed  as an instrument  of redistribution,  succeeding govern- 
ments came to view the public purse and public enterprises as private 
slush funds, to be used for personal gain or political patronage. Malloy 
and Gamarra (1987) have termed this condition “neopatrimonialism.” 
3.3 
As shown in table 3.6, Bolivia’s external debt rose dramatically in 
the 1970s, mostly during the Banzer era. Bolivia’s rapid accumulation 
of external debt in the  1970s reflected  three forces at work. Part of 
the foreign borrowing financed a plausible attempt to generate a more 
Origins of the Debt Crisis: The Banzer Era Table 3.6  Bolivian External Debt, 1970-85 
$ millions  1970  1975  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Total debt"  481.7  824.4  2,228.6  2,679.2  2,769.1  3,105.1  3,203.5  3,259.3 
(MLT public and 
publicly guaranteed) 
Debt/GNP (%)  46.3  46.2  78. I  89.3  102.6  111.5  115.9  124.8 
DeWExports (%)  232.6  166.7  213.1  262.3  301.5  345.4  377.8  441.9 
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tubles, 1986-87  edition. 
"Debt outstanding and disbursed, medium- and long-term maturities, on public and publicly guaranteed debt 67  Bolivia’s Economic Crisis 
diversified export base through various investment projects. Some of 
these projects, such as natural gas exports to Argentina, proved suc- 
cessful.  Others, such as investment in  crude petroleum production, 
proved to be failures.  Less benignly, the foreign  borrowing also re- 
flected  an attempt  to finesse  the  internal  distributional  conflict  on 
borrowed money and borrowed time. The government did not attempt 
to raise taxes (and indeed rejected a detailed tax reform proposal of 
the Musgrave Commission). Third, and most perniciously, some of the 
foreign  borrowing had the purpose and effect of  enriching a narrow 
set of private interests via the public sector’s access to foreign loans. 
Similarly, an overvalued exchange rate, maintained  through  foreign 
borrowing,  became  a  channel  for  capital  flight  for  the  wealthier 
individuals. 
The economic record of the Banzer years look quite good when taken 
in isolation. Bolivian GDP growth averaged 5.4 percent per year, which 
was far above the average of 2.4 percent during the whole period 1952- 
85. Prices were rather stable except in  1974, following a major deval- 
uation of the Bolivian peso.  Investment as a share of GNP reached 
historical highs, as did government revenues relative to GNP, though 
the gap between government expenditures and government revenues 
widened. In an era of easy foreign finance, however, the gap was readily 
filled by eager foreign bankers. Few observers at the time realized the 
precariousness of the Banzer boom, built  as it was on a temporary 
commodity boom, easy access to foreign finance, and a narrow political 
base. 
Banzer’s rule  lasted for seven years, an extraordinary stretch by 
Bolivian standards. For three years, Banzer ruled with the support of 
both leftist and rightist political parties. As Malloy and Gamarra (1987, 
103) indicate, Banzer jettisoned these parties in  1974 when he recog- 
nized that “they were rump factions who represented little more than 
cliques whose primary purpose was to lay claim to public-sector jobs.” 
From  1974 to 1978, Banzer ruled  with the support of private-sector 
business, the military, and some technocrats. Because of the booming 
economy, Banzer enjoyed the support of the urban middle classes, and 
even some favored labor groups such as the railway workers, but faced 
continued  strong opposition  from most of  organized  labor, and the 
leftist parties. 
Another important dimension of support and opposition to Banzer 
was regional. The eastern part of the country, and especially Banzer’s 
home province of Santa Cruz, provided strong support and were major 
beneficiaries of Banzer’s policies. Groups in this region were favored 
with grants of property rights over public  lands, and with  generous 
subsidized credits. An important illustration  of how the government 
distributed public revenues to private supporters is the case of loans 68  Juan Antonio MoralesiJeffrey  D. Sachs 
for large-scale  cotton production  in the Santa Cruz region, made by 
the government Agricultural Bank (Banco Agricola Boliviano) between 
1972 and 1975. Tens of millions of dollars were loaned to a small number 
of  large  landowners  during an incipient  cotton boom. The Bolivian 
producers sold their crops forward on world markets, but then tried 
to renegotiate  when  the spot market prices  rose above the forward 
contract price. They failed in the renegotiations, and in the end, much 
of the cotton remained undelivered. The growers quietly defaulted on 
the Agricultural  Bank loans and the government absorbed the losses 
with no attempt to collect or to  foreclose on any property. To this day, 
the bad cotton loans have undermined the solvency of the Agricultural 
Bank. 
In 1975, the Banzer regime announced a five-year development plan 
which encapsulated the governing philosophy. The plan aimed at export 
promotion led by state investment. The public sector was targeted with 
71  percent of total  investment over the period, focussed heavily  on 
hydrocarbons, mainly in the Santa Cruz region. Financing of the plan 
was to rely on the profits from petroleum exports, which in the event 
never materialized, and on foreign borrowing, which did. Most of the 
plan however was never implemented. 
In  1977 and 1978, General Banzer faced growing pressure from the 
Carter administration for a return to democracy. An election was called, 
but was annulled after charges of massive fraud. When Banzer then 
tried to remain in office, he was ousted in a coup. There ensued a four- 
year period of intense political instability, with several interim presi- 
dents, coups, and deadlocked elections, producing in all nine different 
heads of state between Banzer and Siles. 
Bolivia reached its political nadir in  1980 and  1981, when General 
Garcia Meza deposed the interim president Lidia Gueiler. The Garcia 
Meza regime was deeply implicated in the burgeoning cocaine industry, 
and therefore never received international support, except  for the back- 
ing from the similarly corrupt and violent military regime in Argentina. 
Capital flight reached new highs in the period, with errors and omissions 
in the balance of payments in  1980 and 1981 totalling $590 million, or 
about 10 percent of 1980 GNP. The commercial banks stopped all lend- 
ing, and negotiated an emergency rescheduling agreement which was 
soon defaulted  upon. The rest of  the international  community  also 
ceased new lending, except for two important loans from the Argentine 
regime. 
Not one of  the heads of  state during this chaotic period  had  the 
political  backing  to address the acute economic problems facing the 
country. Banzer’s  strategy  of foreign borrowing  had  run  its course, 
with insufficient export earnings and government revenues to show for 
it. The various goverments following Banzer during 1978-82  were in 69  Bolivia’s Economic Crisis 
no position to raise taxes or enforce economic austerity, and so they 
resorted to printing money  when the flow of foreign money changed 
from net inflow to net outflow. On top of the problem of obtaining fresh 
credits, commodity prices started to slide in  1981, and interest rates 
on the existing international loans soared. By October 1982, when the 
Siles Zuazo government came to power, the economy was in a sharp 
downward slide. Real GNP had declined by an estimated 0.9 percent 
in  1981 and by 8.7 percent in  1982. The price level had risen by 308 
percent in the 12 months preceding Siles’s accession to power. 
3.4  The March to Hyperinflation 
It is important to appreciate the political implications of Siles’s acces- 
sion to power in  1982. The new administration  represented the first 
elected government in  18 years, so that pent-up social and economic 
aspirations were sure to boil over early in the term. Siles represented 
the left wing of the MNR, and governed  in a coalition with  various 
leftist parties, including the Communist Party of Bolivia. In the early 
phase of the administration, organized labor gave support to the new 
government, but  only  in  return for significant wage  increases. Ulti- 
mately, when the financially strapped government was unable and un- 
willing to grant wage increases to keep ahead of the accelerating inflation, 
organized labor turned bitterly against the government. General strikes 
by organized labor in  1984 and  1985 killed the final two stabilization 
attempts of the Siles administration. 
The hyperinflation under Siles was not so much a result of an ex- 
plosion of new spending as  the inability to restrain spending in the face 
of falling foreign loans, falling tax revenues, and higher debt service 
payments abroad. The coalition members were never able to agree on 
policies  to restrain  spending,  while the government’s right-wing op- 
ponents in the Bolivian Congress rejected all proposals to broaden or 
even stabilize the tax base.  At  a fundamental level,  moreover, the 
coalition government failed to realize that the deepening crisis was an 
indictment of the system of state capitalism itself, and especially of the 
financial limitations of that system. To the end, the Siles administration 
defended the logic of a large state enterprise sector, even as it tried to 
squeeze key state enterprises in order to support the finances of the 
rest of the government. 
The hyperinflation and debt crisis developed as Bolivia’s net resource 
transfers from the rest of the world turned negative in 1982. Seignorage 
financing (i.e.,  printing  money) substituted  for the decline in foreign 
resource flows. Table 3.7 demonstrates this shift in foreign resources 
for a subset of loans, the medium- and long-term public or publicly 
guaranteed loans. We see that for 1979 through 1981, new net borrowing 70  Juan Antonio MoraledJeffrey  D. Sachs 
Table 3.7  Bolivia’s Debt Servicing of  Medium- and Long-Term 
Public-Sector Debt 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Net interest payments 
Official creditors 
Private creditors 
Net new lending 
Official creditors 
Private creditors 
Net resource transfer 
Official creditors 
Private creditors 
Net resource transfers 


























-  14.4 
-92.2 
36.8 
-  129.1 




-  18.0 
13.5 
-31.5 
-  190.8 
-51.3 
-  139.5 






-  2.9 
-  140.8 
-  120.9 
-37.9 
-5.1 
Source: World  Bank, World Debt Tublrs, 1985-1986  edition 
by the public sector exceeded the interest payments on the public debt. 
In 1982, however, net new lending plummeted, so that the transfer of 
resources to Bolivia (net new loans minus interest payments) turned 
sharply negative. As a percentage of GNP, net resource transfers on 
the loans in table 3.7 shifted from 6.2 percent of GNP in  1980, to 3.1 
percent of GNP in 1981, to -3.4  percent of GNP  in 1982, and to -6.9 
percent of GNP in  1983. 
The  jump in seignorage, which fueled the hyperinflation, is the mirror 
image of the declining net resource transfer from abroad. As the gov- 
ernment devoted an increasing share of resource to foreign debt serv- 
icing, it resorted to printing money to finance the balance of its domestic 
spending. Figure 3.1 shows this pattern clearly. Seignorage jumped in 
mid-1982, several months before Siles’s term began. Aside from sea- 
sonal spikes in seignorage in the fourth quarter of most years (asso- 
ciated  with  a  Christmas  wage  bonus  for  public-sector  workers), 
seignorage  remained  at a  high  plateau  of  about  12 percent of GNP 
annually until  stabilization was achieved  in  late  1985. Note that the 
decline in net resource transfers (a shift of about 10 percent of GNP), 
and the rise in seignorage, are of about the same magnitude. 
The relative constancy of government seignorage does not reflect a 
stable level of  government  spending, taxes, and monetary  emission. 
Rather, the constancy of the seignorage collection hides a process of 
fiscal  collapse  in  which  tax revenue collections all but  disappeared, 
while government spending (particularly on public investment projects) 
was cut back sharply in a vain attempt to catch up with  the moving 
target of falling  tax collections.  Meanwhile,  the monetary  emission 71  Bolivia's  Economic Crisis 
Fig. 3.1  Seignorage per quarter (percentage of annual GNP) 
prompted repeated and accelerating depreciations of the exchange rate, 
which then fed into inflation. As inflation accelerated, the demand for 
real money balances fell, so that a constant rate of seignorage collection 
as a percentage of  GNP was associated with an accelerating inflation 
and a falling level of  real money balances. 
Government revenues in Bolivia in the early 1980s relied heavily on 
three main forms of taxes: internal taxes (mainly sales, property, and 
income taxes); taxes on trade (mainly tariff collections); and taxes on 
hydrocarbons and minerals (mainly paid by  COMIBOL and Y PFB). 
As shown in figure 3.2,  each of these taxes plummeted as a percentage 
of GNP. Overall, revenues of the central administration (the TGN) fell 
from more than 9 percent of GNP in  1980 to just  1.3 percent of  GNP 
in the first nine months of  1985. The proportion of TGN expenditures 
backed  by  TGN revenues fell from 65.5 percent  in  1979 to just 6.9 
percent in the first nine months of  1985. 
As is well known from the studies of Olivera (1967) and Tanzi (1977), 
inflation itself can be a major factor in undermining the government 
revenue collections. In Bolivia, several particular institutional factors 
were at work. With income taxes, simple lags in collection reduced the 
real value of collections almost to nothing by 1985. Similarly, property 
taxes and several excise taxes were stated in  specific, rather than ad 
valorem, terms. Thus, as the price level rose, the real value of the tax 72  Juan Antonio MoraledJeffrey D. Sachs 
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collections fell. Tariff revenues declined for several reasons. The down- 
turn in economic activity reduced  imports, and therefore  tax collec- 
tions.  Equally important, the official exchange rate was persistently 
overvalued relative to the black  market rate. This had the effect of 
encouraging  smuggling, on which  tariffs  are typically  not  collected. 
Even when goods were imported legally, however, the tariff in pesos 
was collected on the basis of the official exchange rate, and therefore 
the real value of the tariff collections was substantially reduced. The 
taxes on mining and hydrocarbons were similarly squeezed. The over- 
valued exchange rate reduced the profitability of the state enterprises 
in  these sectors, and they  therefore paid  their taxes to the central 
government on a sporadic basis only. Indeed, the central bank made 
large transfers to the state enterprises to keep them functioning despite 
the squeeze on their operating revenues. 
It is more difficult to offer an account of spending patterns by the 
central government during the hyperinflation period, because of serious 
data limitations. The  following major points seem clear, however. There 
was a sharp squeeze on public investment spending rather than wages 
and salaries as  the Siles government attempted to cope with the growing 
fiscal crisis. Union opposition successfully forestalled any serious at- 
tempts to reduce public sector real wages or public employment, until 
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the end of the hyperinflation. Until the spring of 1984, the government 
squeezed internal spending and relied on monetary emission to make 
room for interest servicing on the foreign debt. In the spring of 1984, 
the government finally quit debt service payments on the government 
debt to the commercial banks. By this time, ironically, the rising infla- 
tion had so ravaged the tax system that even with  the suspension of 
interest payments, the deficit on a cash-basis remained enormous, so 
that the resort to seignorage finance was hardly slowed. 
There are many particular features of public finance in this period 
that help to give a deeper insight into the dynamics of the hyperinflation. 
In a foolhardy attempt to restrain  inflation, the government resorted 
continually to ineffectual price controls, overvalued and multiple ex- 
change rates, and other forms of intervention. These policies  had no 
effect on the general price  level, but  they frequently  threatened the 
solvency  of  private  and public  firms.  In  response, the government 
would typically find some indirect way to compensate the firms for the 
intervention measures, and thus the direct price control measure would 
show up as an indirect fiscal subsidy, adding to the government’s need 
for inflation finance. 
While the hyperinflation was a disaster for the economy and Bolivian 
society as  a whole, many well-connected rent-seeking individuals made 
considerable fortunes in the course of the hyperinflation. Anybody with 
access to official foreign exchange from the central bank could become 
wealthy almost instantly during the period, by purchasing cheap dollars 
at the central bank and selling them at a several hundred percent profit 
in the black market. Similarly, commercial bankers, who took deposits 
at zero interest and lent money at high nominal interest rates, shared 
in the government’s seignorage gains. Moreover, the government ex- 
tended large amounts of low-interest loans during the period, often to 
politically powerful landowners, which effectively became grants as a 
result of the inflation. Price controls on public-sector goods, including 
flour and petroleum  products, generated opportunities for lucrative 
smuggling operations. All  of these opportunities for gain provided  a 
powerful constituency of those who wanted to see the hyperinflation 
continue. 
3.5  The Stabilization Process 
The inflation under Siles went from annual rates of several hundred 
percent in 1982 and 1983 to several thousand percent in  1984 and 1985. 
According  to Cagan’s  classic  definition  of  hyperinflation  (price  in- 
creases exceeding 50 percent per month), the true hyperinflation began 
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of the Paz Estenssoro government. It should be noted that Siles tried 
several times to implement a comprehensive stabilization program (dur- 
ing November 1982, November 1983, April 1984, August 1984, Novem- 
ber  1984,  and  February  1985),  but  in  each  of  these  cases,  some 
combination of Siles’s political opponents in Congress, and his osten- 
sible “allies”  in organized labor, torpedoed the adjustment efforts. 
The successful stabilization program was carried out by the newly 
elected center-right government of Paz Estenssoro. The government 
came to power in rather inauspicious circumstances, after another elec- 
tion which failed to produce a clear majority for one of the candidates. 
The program of the Paz administration was unveiled only three weeks 
after the government came to power. The program  was remarkably 
wide  ranging,  and indeed  radical,  encompassing not  only  plans for 
macroeconomic stabilization, but also for trade liberalization, admin- 
istrative and tax reform, and deregulation and privatization in the do- 
mestic market. The so-called “New Economic Policy”  was nothing 
less than a call to dismantle the system of state capitalism that had 
prevailed over the previous thirty years. 







A stable unified exchange rate backed by tight fiscal and monetary 
policies 
Increased public-sector  revenues, via tax reform and improved 
public sector prices 
A reduced public-sector wage bill, through reductions of employ- 
ment in  state enterprises (particularly COMIBOL) and reduced 
rates of real compensation 
An effective elimination of debt servicing, through a combination 
of rescheduling with official creditors, and a unilateral suspension 
of payments to private creditors until a more fundamental debt 
settlement could be arranged 
A resumption  of concessional  foreign financial assistance, from 
foreign governments and the multilateral  institutions 
The leading trade union organization,  which had opposed and mo- 
bilized against similar, indeed far less dramatic, policy packages under 
Siles, called for a general strike in opposition to the program. But after 
three years of accelerating inflation, and the sense of chaos in early 
1985, the new government clearly had the upper hand. A temporary 
state of  siege under the constitution was declared, and the strike was 
quickly broken. 
The fiscal measures, combined with a buildup of internal arrears by 
the central government, were sufficient to obviate the need for fiscal 
credit from the central bank  to support government spending.  The 75  Bolivia’s Economic Crisis 
Week  of  Program 
Fig. 3.3  Weekly inflation  rates (week 0 = 8/26 -  9/1) 
exchange rate stabilized  almost  immediately, and  with  a  stable ex- 
change rate, the price level stopped rising. As shown in figure 3.3, the 
remarkable break in the hyperinflation  began no more than one week 
after the inception of the program! Inflation fell from a rate of more 
than 50 percent per month to price stability almost immediately. The 
key to price stability proved to be a stable unified exchange rate, pro- 
tected by  tight  fiscal  and  monetary policies.  When  the government 
deviated from  that policy  temporarily  at the end of  1985, the high 
inflation quickly surged again, but this time it was stopped by a reas- 
sertion of fiscal discipline. From February 1986 to July 1987, the infla- 
tion rate has averaged only 10- 15 percent at an annual rate, one of the 
lowest inflation rates in Latin America. 
One key aspect of the stabilization should be highlighted, to contrast 
the case of  Bolivia with  those of  Argentina,  Brazil,  and Peru. The 
Bolivian stabilization was highly orthodox with respect to monetary, 
fiscal, and pricing policies (though it was “heterodox” in its continued 
suspension of  foreign debt payments).  The stabilization program es- 
chewed all wage and price controls as part of the anti-inflation effort, 
and indeed freed many controls at the inception of the program. It is 
likely that the hyperinflation had obviated any need for price controls 
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eliminated all vestiges of long-term contracts, and therefore all vestiges 
of inertial inflation. Peso prices were basically being set at the end of 
the hyperinflation  by converting dollar prices of  goods into pesos at 
the spot market exchange rate. Thus, by stabilizing the exchange rate, 
the inflation  rate was immediately stabilized to the prevailing rate of 
dollar inflation in world markets. 
In reality, stabilization is a cumulative process, not an event. While 
prices quickly stopped rising, fiscal reform has been underway for two 
years, and the results are still unsatisfactory in major areas. The gov- 
ernment has had to proceed gradually along three major dimensions: 
(1) a rebuilding of the national tax system, which had virtually collapsed 
by the end of the hyperinflation; (2)  a reestablishment  of normal  re- 
lations with the government’s various creditors, both internal and ex- 
ternal; and  (3) a restructuring  of  the public sector, to provide for a 
more durable solution to the fiscal crisis. Let us consider each of these 
in turn. 
The restoration of a stable revenue base has proceeded in  stages. 
The immediate and  crucial actions of the Paz government  were the 
raising of public-sector prices and the unification of the exchange rate. 
In addition, some back taxes on hydrocarbons and tin were also col- 
lected at the outset of the stabilization program, to give the government 
some fiscal breathing space. Eight months later, the Bolivian Congress 
approved the government’s tax reform measures, which most impor- 
tantly instituted a national value added tax of 10  percent. (Character- 
istically,  the Congress postponed  a  tax on land  wealth  until  1988.) 
Implementation of the tax measures has been slow and uneven how- 
ever, despite the formation of a new Ministry  of Taxation. Adminis- 
trative difficulties  and political pressures from powerful groups have 
slowed the introduction of the new taxes. 
Even more difficult, perhaps, has been the process of extricating the 
government from an enormous overhang of national debt. The Banzer 
government bequeathed a highly indebted public sector to Siles, and 
the Siles administration bequeathed  a truly bankrupt public sector to 
Paz. Not only were payments to all international creditors, both public 
and  private, deeply  in  arrears by  1985, but  payments internally  to 
various creditors were also in default. 
With respect to the international creditors, the government has sought 
substantial debt relief.  For foreign governments that are creditors of 
Bolivia, the government has rescheduled payments via the Paris Club. 
For multilateral  creditors, including the World Bank and the IMF, the 
government has become current on payments, partly on the view that 
it stands to receive net resource inflows from the multilateral agencies. 
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ernment has maintained a suspension of interest payments, and has 
been  negotiating  with  the creditors for a “fundamental”  solution to 
that part of the debt, by means of some mechanism of debt repurchase 
and cancellation. 
The indebtedness problems are also severe internally, though mea- 
sured internal  debt is  rather low.  The Siles administration  failed  to 
honor many  internal  obligations,  to private  suppliers  as  well  as  to 
regional corporations and other quasi-official entities. In many cases, 
promises for transfer payments were made by the Siles government as 
a way to buy time or support, in full knowledge that the obligations 
could not be  met. Thus, as revenues under the current government 
have increased, the pressures for renewed payments on various out- 
standing commitments  have also risen. The government has been forced 
into negotiations on many of these ostensible claims, and each nego- 
tiation has generated a domestic political battle that threatens the fragile 
fiscal equilibrium. 
Since the Bolivian government does not have the benefit of a bank- 
ruptcy proceeding that would partially cancel its outstanding  debts once 
and for all, it will continue for many years to be buffeted by various 
claimants. Each creditor has the incentive to fight bitterly for full pay- 
ment on its claims, and thereby to  beat the other claimants, even though 
all creditors well recognize the impossibility that the total sum of claims 
can be met. This “grab race”  among the various creditors, which is 
precisely what is blocked by formal bankruptcy proceedings,  leads to 
a constant and bruising political battle between the government and its 
various creditors, a battle which continues to put the government at 
political jeopardy. 
The third part of the stabilization process cited earlier is the reform 
of state administration. Under Banzer and Siles,  the central government 
had grown to extravagant proportions, since much of the government 
had degenerated into a patronage machine. This bloated and unwieldy 
state mechanism was already on the verge of collapse before the end 
of 1985, when suddenly tin and petroleum prices plummeted on world 
markets. To preserve fiscal balance, the government had to launch a 
bruising, indeed brutal, battle to reduce the employment in COMIBOL 
and YPFB. Although fiscally necessary, the results are stunning, and 
indeed reflect a social tragedy. COMIBOL has reduced its employment 
from about 30,000 workers in  1985 to just 7,000 as of  1987. Many of 
these workers are unemployed, or marginally employed, or have gone 
to the coca growing region to find work. The mining towns themselves 
have been decimated.  Employment  in YPFB has also been  reduced, 
though not as dramatically, from 9,000 workers in  1985 to about 5,000 
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3.6  Beyond Stabilization to Economic Growth and Development 
The stabilization has eliminated much of the panic conditions that 
surrounded the hyperinflation  in  1984 and  1985. Virtually  complete 
price stability has been reestablished in Bolivia during 1986 and 1987. 
It is evident, however, that many of the deeper problems in the Bolivian 
economy and society that helped to cause the hyperinflation remain in 
place, and in some cases have deepened. We now mention some of the 
challenges that remain in  converting the current stabilization period 
into the first phase of sustained economic development. 
There are three sociopolitical cleavages that are serious obstacles to 
economic stability and long-term growth: the cleavages of income dis- 
tribution, ideology, and region. 
The income distributional  cleavage  remains  profound, and is  the 
source of considerable political conflict. The key political problem is 
to moderate the  nearly  continuous confrontation  between powerful 
social groups, such  as organized  labor and  private  capital, and the 
various regional forces. The state capitalist model attempted to finesse 
the income distribution problem through a combination of the inflation 
tax, heavy  foreign  borrowing,  and internal  repression of  the lower 
classes. None of these alternatives is effective for a long-term devel- 
opment strategy. 
A key to a more equal distribution of income in Bolivia is an increased 
tax burden on the higher-income individuals. Balancing the budget by 
eliminating basic services, such as health and education, is likely to be 
considerably more regressive distributionally than equity and stability 
increased taxes on higher incomes. Progressive taxation might include 
a tax on land holdings, and higher taxes on luxury consumption goods. 
A second kind of policy to promote a more equal distribution of income 
would be greater public spending on education in the rural sector, where 
most of Bolivia’s poorest citizens live. Investment in the human capital 
of the rural peasantry is a key factor in long-term economic development. 
The second division to overcome is ideological, involving competing 
conceptions of the role  of government. With  the evident failures of 
state capitalism in the past two decades, there is a temptation on one 
side for a strict laissez-faire economic approach, and on the other side, 
for a fortified socialism. A more modulated approach is more likely to 
succeed. Such an approach would recognize the government’s respon- 
sibilities for infrastructure, and social investments in health and edu- 
cation, but also recognize the limitations to the role of the state in the 
productive sector. Part of the push toward laissez-faire in Bolivia is a 
frank acknowledgment of the limited capacity for honest, capable pub- 
lic adminstration in the country. But this limitation could be lessened 
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bureaucracy. A determined effort at improved training of civil servants 
is vital in this regard. 
The third division  is  sectoral and  regional. Mining and petroleum 
products can no longer be the basis of a vibrant  Bolivian economy. 
Nor can coca production.  Export diversification will require a turn to 
agriculture  and  light  manufacturing,  which  in  turn  will  surely entail 
some geographical  shift  in  the locus of  economic activity  from the 
highlands to the lowlands. This kind of shift can be politically destruc- 
tive if  not  handled  with  foresight  and  planning.  To  accomplish  this 
restructuring, future governments will have to tread carefully between 
goals of allocating investment expenditures heavily  towards the new 
sectors and regions, and the need to  distribute the burdens and benefits 
of public spending in a politically stabilizing manner. 
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